Sino-Japanese Rapprochement as a “Diplomatic Revolution”

Shi Yinhong

Part One:

In recent years, the persistent, comprehensive and profound tensions between China and Japan have created troublesome and provocative problems. Particularly disturbing is the fact that the most pronounced and dangerous sign of these tensions comes from the rapidly increasing mutual dislike and hostility in recent years from extremist factions within the two countries, if not the two nations as a whole. The subtitle of a recent important article mirrors the spirit of this development—“The Worries Among the Peoples of China and Japan” In this article, the author uses the approach of reportage, vividly, with much rationality, to list, warn and discuss various phenomena familiar to most of us who lack the courage to directly face and analyze them. Now let us take a look at the results of just one familiar opinion poll whose integrity is beyond reproach to illustrate the seriousness of the development of mutual hostilities between China and Japan. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Japan’s Asahi Shimbun jointly conducted nation-wide polls in both China and Japan between late August and mid-September. The results indicate that 50% of Chinese respondents and 45% of Japanese respondents believe that Sino-Japanese relations are not satisfactory; those who believe otherwise constitutes only 22% (China) and 41%(Japan); that compared to the results of the previous poll conducted in 1997, the number of people who do not believe Sino-Japanese relation to be good increase by 21% (China) and 5% (Japan). This joint opinion poll also indicates that 80% of the Chinese respondents regard “historical consciousness” as the number one negative factor affecting the Sino-Japanese relation; 40% of the Japanese respondents consider “lack of mutual understanding” and “differences in the political systems” as the top negative factors affecting the bilateral relationship. In general, the situation, as reported by Asahi Shimbun, is: “most Japanese and Chinese do not believe the relationship between their two countries is good,” and in comparison with previous years, “the Sino-Japanese relationship is deteriorating.”

Due to the anti-Japanese popular sentiment and public opinion among the Chinese population in recent years, coupled with misleading press coverage and research, the general public in China almost completely lacks the understanding of how in recent years the Japanese public feels about China and perceives China, let alone how this public opinion in Japan influences Japan’s domestic politics. Therefore, it is for our benefit to read an article published in the British journal “The Economist” in early 2001, which in part states that “in these days…despite official pronouncement of good news, Sino-Japanese relationship is not good and is getting worse. The Japanese blame the worsening relationship on China’s aggressiveness in trade and foreign policy. However, a considerable part of the reason for it can be found in the Japanese society itself, where the traditional policy of “engaging China” is being criticized by a new generation of assertive politicians, scholars and newspaper people. Even the officials at the Foreign Ministry have begun to pay attention. Suddenly, Japan’s official policy toward China starts to harden;” and within all circles in Japanese society, “the hawks who want tougher policy toward China have a loyal audience…the sick economy and high unemployment rate are fanning the flames of Chauvinism.” In addition, the article further believes that China’s demands and condemnations against Japan, the wide-spread anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese public, trade conflicts, territorial disputes, illegal Chinese immigrants to Japan, the criminal acts and secret society involvement of some Chinese living in Japan all have helped Japan’s “nationalists in various stripes,” based upon some popular sympathy and appeal, “demand for a more assertive policy toward China,” and right wing hawks such as Shintaro Ishihara are “getting growing support, especially among the younger Japanese.” The reasons for these developments are complicated, as reported by the same article. Japan’s economy, politics, and psychology in general are the key factors in facilitating these developments. But undoubtedly, certain basic postures and actions toward Japan inside China, from the populace to the government, also play a role in formulating these development, regardless of how righteous these Chinese postures and actions may be. What China should do, however, is first and foremost to advance its own position in related strategies, so that the Sino-Japanese relation, which is vital to China’s own interest, will be dramatically improved.

Part Two:

Japan is adjacent to China, with a population over 100 million, leading the world in economy and technology, thus possessing considerable capabilities to become a strong military power. Therefore, it is safe to believe that if the increasing dislike and hostility between the two nations in recent years continue to develop without being checked, China’s medium- and long-term future will be in grave danger. Frankly, one of the dangers lies in the fact that if anti-China, xenophobic, ultra-nationalistic and political/military expansionist elements such as Shintaro Ishihara may someday control the directions of Japan’s politics and foreign policy. This is perhaps why the Chinese leadership has repeatedly and appropriately stressed a strategic long-term approach free of trivialities toward Sino-Japanese relation. Realizing such danger, realizing the harsh security environment China is facing in East Asia, it is vitally important that we attempt a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, doing our utmost to avoid or dissolve the “security dilemma” between China and Japan. While challenged by an often hostile United States, an often hostile Taiwan, and a possibly hostile India, China cannot afford having a hostile Japan. From an overall perspective, the fundamentally important principle of strategic concentration requires drastic efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations, to reach a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, so that China will be able to concentrate on medium and long term plans to deal with the real and potential hostility, pressure and threat against China posed by the United States, and on devoting its time and energy to the important task of preventing Taiwanese independence and hastening unification.

Yet in the meantime, we must realize that Japan is the primary ally of the U.S. in East Asia. Japan lacks the tradition of an independent diplomacy. That is to say, we can not predict that the existing or potential conflicts between Japan and the U.S. will necessarily lead to a fundamental collapse of the U.S-Japanese political and military alliance in a foreseeable future. Moreover, there are many reasons to believe that Japan will be happy to see China encounter peripheral problems; there are also many reasons for Japan to become suspicious of China’s rise to power and thus the power transition from Japan to China in East Asia. All of this will make Japan unwilling to accept, and even vigilant against the “diplomatic revolution” that is designed as an obvious strategic attempt to promote Sino-Japanese cooperation for the purpose of checking the U.S. This is reminiscent of Austria after 1890. At the time, it seemed completely impossible for Austria to become an ally of France or Russia for the purpose of checking Germany. Yet at the same time, there are many key factors that make it possible for Japan to, like China, seriously, even enthusiastically desire to move closer to China. These factors include China’s geographical location, which makes Japan worry about a possible Sino-Japanese conflict; demands for investment and trade in China, which resulted from a persistent economic recession; the necessity for Japan to maintain its influence in East Asian economic structure after the rise of China’ economy, which will only become possible through cooperating with China; the importance of cooperation and coordination with China on East Asian international politics, especially the security issues in Northeast Asia, which is key for the Japanese to maintain sufficient sense of security and to realize Japan’s ambition to become a significant regional political power; the still mainstream current of quasi-pacifistic political culture of a “trading state” that developed after World War II; the unease of the Japanese over the prospect that stability of East Asia and Japan’s security being threatened by an overly abrasive policy toward China conducted by the U.S. which is overly hegemonic, unilateralist, and even militaristic; and finally, Japan’s own desire to change the awkward feeling that although Japan is geographically located in East Asia it has long been far apart psychologically and emotionally from its major neighbors, primarily the giant and increasingly important China. If Sino-Japanese relationship improves dramatically and the Sino-Japanese rapprochement becomes a reality, it will be natural and inevitable that China’s strategic position and China’s diplomatic dealings with the U.S. will be strengthened. The Sino-Japanese rapprochement can be a “diplomatic revolution” albeit one with some degree of discounted qualification.

As stated before, the stake is enormously high for China to improve its security environment and diplomatic position through a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. However, China has a greater need than Japan to improve the two countries’ relationship. On the other hand, due to reasons of history, national psychology, and the structure of international politics in East Asia, this relationship is not an easy one in the first place. The governmental policies and public opinions in recent years in the two countries have caused the relationship to further deteriorate. The rewards are great, but so are the difficulties. This calls for the Chinese government to take the initiative, with innovative thinking and strategic determination, to approach Japan for a rapprochement. China must be willing to pay the seemingly huge price (or to put it another way, to voluntarily, drastically adjust our attitude, our posture and our policy toward Japan). This becomes even more necessary considering the basically ineffective state of certain current policies and attitudes. To improve the Sino-Japanese relationship, even more importantly, to improve the entire Chinese security environment and diplomatic status, we must at least try “the strategy of the indirect approach” or the approach of strategic detour, as proposed by one of the most famous strategist thinkers, H. Liddel Hart.

Part Three:

To achieve a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, what must China do? There are five things to be done:

First, for a long period in the future, unless there is a serious backsliding on this matter perpetrated by the Japanese government, we should more or less be satisfied with the level of remorse and regret publicly displayed by the Japanese government in regard to the crimes conduced by the Japanese against the Chinese in history. That is to say, we should take the “historical problems” out of our diplomatic agenda with Japan for a relatively long period of time in the future, and accordingly take them out of the official and semi-official propaganda agenda. To do this, we must possess confidence and patience that the historical issues, that have become the biggest factor in aggravating Sino-Japanese mutual enmity and impeding Sino-Japanese rapprochement, will be eventually settled. This requires us to have an overall strategic view of China’s security situation, a strategic deliberateness and a sense of priority. That is to say, we must never forget the aforementioned principle of strategic concentration—concentrating on dealing with the U.S., concentrating on preventing Taiwanese independence and precipitating unification. To do this, we must mobilize all the possible positive factors and avoid or reduce all the possible hindrances and road blocks.

Second, while keeping a balance of strategic demands and economic demands, a balance of medium to long range interest and short to medium range interest, we should rely on the active and powerful governmental policies to stimulate and coordinate, within possible limitations, relatively large scale Japanese import and Japanese investment in China, to the extent that will make the Japanese government, financial circles and the public deeply feel we have helped slow down their economic backsliding. To make this happen, China perhaps should reduce an appropriate percentage of the U.S. and E.U. nations’ trade and investment in China. In the meantime, to meet the goal of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement, we should adopt a relatively tolerant attitude and policy toward Japan in bilateral trade disputes. The Chinese government, represented by our top leader, should frequently use appropriately strong language to express gratitude to Japan for its large scale economic assistance to China since the beginning of our “Reform and Opening” in the late 1970s.

Third, we should adopt an internally vigilant, externally tolerant attitude toward Japan’s military expansion and certain revisions of the Japanese military’s mission. We should change our pattern of knee-jerk reaction to the possibility of Japan becoming a “big military power” (a possibility that has often been exaggerated) and our habit of rushing to the open expression of our unease. Our basic strategic point is not to be bothered by “the China Threat Theory” and to devote our overwhelming resources to the task of the military struggle against Taiwan, under the guidance of our national grand strategy. We should talk less and do more, seizing the day to speed up comprehensive modernization of our military. On the topic of Japanese military and even Japan as a whole, we should talk gingerly, overstatements could only be harmful. When we do things we should emphasize results. We should never do things that will not generate results.

We must actively seek any opportunity to build military mutual trust between China and Japan, even between China on one hand, and the U.S.-Japanese military alliance on the other. Toward such trust, we of course should not have illusions, but we should not give up any hope and do nothing. Related to this is the absolute necessity to continually explain to the Japanese government, political elites, and the public opinion makers that while China is undergoing a robust, comprehensive military improvement and construction, China harbors no desire for expansionism and that as long as Taiwan does not declare independence, we will not launch a military attack on Taiwan.

Fourth, we should take the initiative to welcome, and even invite, Japan as a major power to participate in events dealing with key multilateral issues in East Asia such as international security, political cooperation, and economic stability and prosperity. China should make the Japanese government and the Japanese public come to the clear and persistent conclusion that China will treat Japan as a major power—a major world and regional economic power for today as well as a major political power for tomorrow’s East Asia, and that China plans to coordinate and cooperate with Japan as a major power in dealing with the international politics and economy in East Asia, not based upon the principle of a power struggle among the major nations but upon the principle of coordination and cooperation among the major nations. Therefore, in the immediate future, we should pay special attention to two important issues. The first is that under the existing bilateral and multilateral framework, we should greatly enhance our coordination and cooperation with Japan on the current crisis in the Korean Peninsula, to advance peace, stability and non-nuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, to prevent the repeat of a history of power grabbing and struggle in the region. The second vital thing we should do in the near future is to do our best to coordinate, not compete, with Japan in the process of creating a free trade system and economic integration in Southeast Asia, to prevent what a Japanese political columnist calls “the struggle for the leadership role between Tokyo and Beijing over the economic integration process in Southeast Asia.” These two issues, combined with the issue discussed in Part Three, contain strategic significance for Sino-Japanese relations. They form the basic agenda for an urgent and far-reaching strategic summit for the Chinese and Japanese leaders and for the bureaucratic coordinators in both capitals.

Fifth, on the issue of reform of the Security Council of the United Nations, we should treat Japan fairly, both in policy statements and in attitude, i.e., to fairly regard Japan’s desire to become a permanent member of the Security Council, not to make special demands for Japan that are not demanded of other htmirants such as India and Egypt. Or even further, we should even choose the right moment to support Japan becoming a permanent member of the United Nation’s Security Council.

Part Four:

It is very important for us to understand that for China, the Sino-Japanese rapprochement can be called a “diplomatic revolution.” If we think calmly, realistically, and innovatively, we will realize that to achieve all the five htmects aforementioned, China does not necessarily have to pay a high price, let alone jeopardizing China’s fundamental interest, or abandoning our basic stance on maintaining our security, such as our self-strengthening efforts. Realistically speaking, China’s current political and cultural climate may prevent any or all of the five points mentioned from coming to fruition. China may have to temporarily accept as a given these obstacles in order to overcome them on our path to the future, as demanded by our national grand strategy; others seek to achieve a “win-win” result for both China and Japan, so that China’s key national interests will be advanced; yet there are other htmects that are tantamount to “damage prevention,” i.e., sometimes things are developing in a certain direction that you are certain you are unable to stop no matter what, and if you try to stop them, you are destined to become a loser, and unnecessarily alienate the Japanese public. Conversely, if you welcome or even help advance these developments, you may obtain positive results, enabling you to exert present or future political and psychological influence.

On the other hand, the abovementioned five htmects are indeed very different from China’s traditional attitude, posture, and policies up to date, and are far beyond the expectation of Japanese government and public (even some nations’ and worlds’ opinion), they therefore indeed represent a kind of “diplomatic revolution.” Although they are not a “diplomatic revolution” through the traditional dramatic moves of an alliance formation, they are nevertheless of great value, very possibly having as similar of an effect as a traditional “diplomatic revolution,” i.e., to demand for a restructuring of the current system in major htmects so that we can be (with slight exaggeration) “embraced by a bright new world while pondering whether we have come to the end of the Earth.”

In comparison with previous leaders, the biggest and most pronounced achievement of the third generation of the Chinese Communist Party leaders, guided by Deng Xiaoping’s new general rule and practice of diplomacy, has been the diligent, persistent and creative efforts to conduct good-neighbor diplomacy. Except in the Western Pacific ring where the Taiwan problem and the U.S. strategy are involved, China’s geopolitical relations with the neighboring countries is the best in China’s modern history. These efforts have also left us with a set of Chinese diplomatic tradition or systemic experience that can only be called extremely important and brilliant. But, due to various natural or man-made factors, the far-from-good Sino-Japanese relationship has been the biggest regret in this overall picture of brilliance. After the 16^th Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government leadership should not only continue with the previous leadership’s holistic good-neighbor diplomacy, but also move forward in harmony with the current zeitgeist, with much innovation. Obviously, in this regard, most vital to our overall strategy, is the imperative task of vigorously promoting Sino-Japanese rapprochement. For the remainder of our current leadership’s tenure in office, this should be one of its biggest goals of diplomacy.

(The author is from the Institute of International Relations, the Chinese People’s University)
[Originally published in Chinese in “Strategy and Management”(zhanlue yu guanli), February 2003 issue. Notes omitted in translation]

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