RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommends that:

- Congress evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. government public diplomacy programs in the East Asian region.
- Congress urge the administration to seek clarification on the Chinese government's views as to what represents a "core interest" as well as what this formulation means for U.S.-China relations, and the implications for U.S. allies and friends.
- Congress ensure that its own Members are made fully aware of the Chinese institutional actors engaged in exchange programs involving officials of the U.S. Government.

ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1. As one prominent example of the debate between international relations scholars about what the rise of China as a great power means for the United States and the rest of the world, see John Mearscheimer and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Clash of the Titans," *Foreign Policy* 146 (January/February 2005).

2. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of David Lampton, March 10, 2011. See also Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, *New Foreign Policy Actors in China* (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Policy Paper No. 26, September 2010). *http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf.*

3. Cheng Bingde, "Speech presented at the U.S. National Defense University" (Washington, DC, May 18, 2011). Notes taken by USCC staff. Many Chinese academics have reinforced these positive messages, and their writings have found a supportive audience among many distinguished American scholars of Chinese affairs. As an example, see Wang Jisi, "A Rising Great Power Finds its Way," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2011); and the comments on Dr. Wang's article in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of David Lampton, March 10, 2011. For further arguments providing an optimistic view of the rise of China and of future U.S.-China relations, see John Ikenberry, "The Rise of China and the Future of the West; Can the Liberal System Survive?" *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2008).

4. For two such examples, see Aaron Friedberg, "Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics," *National Interest* (July-August 2011); and John Mearsheimer, "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (2010).

5. Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005).

6. Gilbert Rozman, *Chinese Strategic Thought Toward Asia* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p. 4. For a further survey on trends in Chinese strategic culture, see Eric C. Anderson and Jeffrey G. Engstrom, *China's Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception* (research report prepared by Science Applications International Corporation on behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2009). *http://www. uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/ApprovedFINAL SAICStrategic DeceptionPaperRevisedDraft06Nov2009.pdf.* See also Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Thomas G. Mahnken, "Secrecy and Stratagem: Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture" (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2011), *http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1515.*

7. "Like communist and revolutionary parties throughout history, formed and nurtured by underground cells and violent conflict with the regimes they sought to overthrow, the Party in China is secretive by habit and inclination." Richard McGregor, *The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2010), p. 20. See also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2009 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2009), pp. 297–298.

8. For discussion of this concept, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2009 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), pp. 292–293.

9. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security,* written testimony of Anne-Marie Brady, April 30, 2009.

10. David Bandurski, "Li Changchun on the Media and China's 'Global Influence'" (Hong Kong, SAR [Special Administrative Region]: China Media Project). *http://cmp.hku.hk/2009/01/19/1457.*

11. Anne-Marie Brady, "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era" (London, United Kingdom: University of Westminster, *Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture,* 2006).

12. Li Changchun, speech made on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of China Central Television. See David Bandurski, "Li Changchun on the Media and China's 'Global Influence'" (Hong Kong, SAR [Special Administrative Region]: China Media Project). *http://cmp. hku.hk/2009/01/19/1457* .

13. Alice Miller, "The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups," *China Leadership Monitor* 26 (Fall 2008). *http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5689.*

14. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of Ashley Esarey, March 10, 2011. Note that "the Office of Foreign Propaganda, which is more commonly known by its other nameplate, the State Council Information Office, oversees matters relating to external propaganda. The two bureaucracies are closely linked and coordinated." See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security,* testimony of Anne-Marie Brady, April 30, 2009.

15. For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2009 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), pp. 294–297.

16. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written testimony of Gary D. Rawnsley, March 10, 2011; and Xinhua News Service (in English, "Xinhua Launches CNC World English Channel," July 1, 2010. *http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-7/01/cG7<13378575.htm.*

17. Xinhua News Service (in English), "Xinhua Opens New Office in NYC's Time Square," May 20, 2011. *http://news.xinhuanet.com/english 2010/business/2011-05/20/c 13884252.htm;* and Stuart Elliott, "Sign of Arrival, for Xinhua, Is 60 Feet Tall," *New York Times,* July 25, 2011.

18. For discussion of this point, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2009 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), pp. 304-307.

19. The advertisement showcased notable Chinese accomplishments in various sections including business, sports, and the arts. See Loretta Chao, "Pro-China Ad Debuts in Times Square," *Wall Street Journal,* January 18, 2011; and Yidi Zhao, "China Airs Commercial in U.S. to Present Positive Image During Hu's Visit," Bloomberg News, January 17, 2011. The advertising videos themselves may be seen at *YouTube.com,* "China Publicity Ads Time Square New York 2011." *http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=570 LHTMWoMw&feature = related.*

20. Stuart Elliott, "Sign of Arrival, for Xinhua, Is 60 Feet Tall," *New York Times,* July 25, 2011.

21. James Fallows, "Happy Birthday, China Daily!" *The Atlantic* (on-line blog edition), June 1, 2011. *http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/happy-birthday-china-daily/239619/.*

22. See James Fallows, *"Official Chinese Propaganda: Now Online from the WaPo [Washington Post]!"The Atlantic (online blog edition),* February 3, 2011. *http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/official-chinese-propaganda-now-online-from-the-wapo/70690/; and* Laura McGann, *"State-Run Papers from China and Russia Buy Convincing Advertorial Sections on the WaPo's [Washington Post] Website"* (Cambridge, MA: Nieman Journalism Lab, Nieman Foundation at Harvard University), December 1, 2010. *http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/12/state-run-papers-from-china-and-russia-buy-convincing-advertorial-sections-on-the-wapos-website/.*

23. The theme of "harmony" has become a staple of CCP propaganda, both stressing the creation of a "socialist harmonious society" inside China and providing a reassuring message to foreign audiences. See John Dotson, "The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government" (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, staff research report, July 20, 2011). *http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/Confucian_Revival_Paper.pdf.*

24. As two such examples from the *China Watch* website ("A Paid Supplement to the Washington Post"), see "China 'Best Served' with [Chinese Communist Party] at the Helm," July 1, 2011, *http://chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/2011/07/china-best-served-with-cpc-at-the-helm.php;* and Zhang Yuwei, "Land of Opportunity Chinese Companies Help Grow US Economy," May 18, 2011, *http://chinawatch.washingtonpost.com/2011/05/land-of-opportunity—chinese-companies-help-grow-us-economy.php.*

25. $300,000 is the approximate cost of placing a six-page, full-color, preprinted advertising insert "with editorial content" (the format employed by the *China Daily)* in a weekday edition of the *Washington Post.* The actual rate per instance of publication may be lower, as clients placing multiple advertising inserts over time can negotiate a lower rate. Additional fees would be charged for hosting web content, such as that found on the *China Watch* website. Source: Telephone inquiry by Commission staff to *Washington Post* advertising department, August 17, 2011.

26. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security,* written testimony of Ross Terrill and oral testimony of Anne-Marie Brady, April 30, 2009.

27. For an example of PRC accusations that negative views of China are fostered by western governments as part of a broader campaign of containment, see Mo Nong, "Part of the Plot to Contain China," *China Daily,* October 11, 2010. *http://www.chinadaily .com.cn/opinion/2010-10/11/content_11392433.htm.*

28. David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Philip Saunders, "China's America Watchers: Changing Attitudes Towards the United States," *China Quarterly* 161 (March 2000); Rosalie Chen, "China Perceives America: Perspectives of International Relations Experts," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12: 35 (2003); and David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2011).

29. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of Gary Rawnsley, March 10, 2011.

30. Dai Xu, *"Zhongguo Ying Gei Meiguo Weidu Xingwei Hua Hong Xian"* (China Must Draw a Red Line Against America's Encircling Actions), *Huanqiu Shibao* (*Global Times*), August 2, 2010. Translation by USCC staff. *http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-08/977633.html.*

31. BBC News OnLine, "China Attacks Bush Foreign Policy," November 1, 2004. *http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3971271.stm.*

32. The depiction of the United States as a predatory "hegemon" is a pillar of the official CCP conception of international affairs. This term has two specific sets of connotations as employed by Chinese writers. One is tied to ancient Chinese concepts of statecraft: As described by author Michael Pillsbury, "One specific Chinese premise from the ancient statecraft of the Warring States era seems to influence Chinese authors who write about the United States today — the concept of how to diagnose and deal with a powerful 'hegemon' (*ba*) that seeks to dominate several other less powerful states. The way hegemons conducted themselves during the Warring States period of ancient China forms one of the sources of the classic lessons of Chinese statecraft . . . One set of 'lessons' (among many) was how to become a hegemon; another was how to survive destruction at the hands of a predatory hegemon." See Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), pp. xxxv-xxxvi. The second set of connotations is tied to the CCP's official Marxist interpretations of modern history and in particular to the analysis of the contemporary world system as laid down by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s: "The world is so full of colonialism, neocolonialism, hegemony and power politics! . . . one Cold War . . . is being waged against all the countries of the South and the Third World, and the other against socialism. The Western countries . . . want to bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist countries towards capitalism. . . . National sovereignty is far more important than human rights, but they often infringe upon the sovereignty of poor, weak countries of the Third World. Their talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries, which take advantage of their strength to bully weak countries, and which pursue hegemony and practice power politics." See Deng Xiaoping, "We Must Adhere To Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution Towards Capitalism" (excerpt from a conversation with Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania), November 23, 1989. From the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,* Vol. 3 (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1994). *http://www.archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03_djvu.txt.*

33. Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy," *Political Science Quarterly* 116: 3 (2001).

34. For examples, see *Global Times,* "Turbulent Mid-East Disrupts the World," February 26, 2011. *http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2011-02/627723.html;* U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2009 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2009), pp. 278–280; and *Beijing Ribao* (*Beijing Daily*), *"Weihu Wending cong Meigeren Zuoqi"* (Maintaining Stability Starts with Every Person), March 6, 2011. Translation by USCC staff. *http://bjrb.bjd.com.cn/html/2011-03/06/content_375830.htm.*

35. Andrew Nathan and Perry Link, eds., *The Tiananmen Papers* (New York, NY: Public Affairs Books, 2001). See in particular "Excerpts from State Security Ministry, 'On Ideological and Political Infiltration into Our Country from the United States and Other International Political Forces,' report to Party Central, June 1," pp. 338–348.

36. Peter Hays Gries, "Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing," *The China Journal* 46 (July 2001); and Peter Hays Gries, *China's New Nationalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 98–108. The 1999 U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing campaign against the former Republic of Yugoslavia has itself been consistently depicted in PRC commentary as part of an effort to "further contain and weaken Russia" by diminishing a Russian ally and expanding NATO military control of Europe. See Wang Naicheng, "Failure of the New Strategic Concept," *Jiefangjun Bao* (*PLA Daily*), May 22, 1999. OSC ID FBIS–CHI–1999–0601, as cited in Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2005), p. 169.

37. Li Mingbo, *"Mei Mimou Jian Dongya Fandao Tixi"* (America's Scheme to Build an Anti-Missile System in East Asia), *Guangzhou Ribao* (*Guangzhou Daily,* online edition), February 13, 2010. Available as "PRC Experts on US 'Plot' To Build East Asia Antimissile System To 'Encircle' PRC." OSD ID CPP201002140 01002. *www.opensource.gov.*

38. "Most Chinese analysts believe (and there is virtual consensus across the spectrum) that the whole concept of global governance is a Western trap which tries to undermine China's sovereignty and lure it into a variety of entanglements where China does not belong. There is a widespread perception that U.S. and EU calls for China to be a 'responsible power' *(fuzeren de daguo)* or 'responsible international stakeholder' are just the latest ruse for retarding and undermining China's power." David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2011).

39. *"Quanqiu Jinrong Weiji Shi Meiguo de Yinmou Ma"* (Is the Financial Crisis an American Conspiracy?) *Huanqiu Shibao* (*Global Times*), October 23, 2008. Translation by USCC staff. *http://www.otliba.com/show_news.asp?ID = 40.* See also Oiwan Lam, "U.S. Economic Crisis a Hot Topic on Chinese Blogs," *Global News Journal Blog* (Reuters News Service), October 2, 2008. *http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/10/02/us-economic-crisis-a-hot-topic-on-chinese-blogs.*

40. Shi Jianxun, "RMB Appreciation Pressure Harmful to Interests of China, EU," *People's Daily OnLine* (in English), October 9, 2010. *http://english.people daily.com.cn/90001/90780/91421/7161021.html*. See also *China Stakes.com,* "Conspiracy Theory Stalks China-US Financial Relations," January 25, 2008. *http://www.chinastakes.com/2008/1/conspiracy-theory-stalks-china-us-financial-relations.html*.

41. People's Republic of China State Council Information Office, "Human Rights Record of the United States in 2010" (Beijing, China: April 11, 2011). *http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/11/content_12300327.htm.*

42. As an example of PRC state media commentary on alleged U.S. involvement in Tibetan unrest, see Xinhua (in English), "Double Act, Old Trick Behind Tibet Chaos," April 18, 2008. The article is posted on the website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States at *http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t426629.* For similar allegations of U.S. involvement in Xinjiang, see *People's Daily Online* (in English), "Rebiya Kadeer's Funding Sources," July 14, 2009. *http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/truexinjiang/urumqi-riot/rebiya-kadeer/2009-07/446397.html.*

43. Michael Wines, "Cables Reveal Early Tensions Between U.S. and China on Nobel Winner," *New York Times,* December 9, 2010; and Malcolm Moore, "China Steps Up Anti-Nobel Campaign by Blocking BBC Website," *Telegraph* (United Kingdom), December 9, 2010.

44. *Global Times,* "2010 Nobel Peace Prize a Disgrace," October 9, 2010. *http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-10/580091.html.* For a more detailed discussion of the controversy in China surrounding the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, see John Dotson, "The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government" (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, staff research report), July 20, 2011. *http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/Confucian_Revival_Paper.pdf.*

45. Bonnie Glaser, "Ensuring that China Rises Peacefully" (Clingendael, The Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 23, 2010). *http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20101223_CAF_artikel_BGlaser.pdf.*

46. Quotation attributed to PRC Vice President Xi Jinping in "China, U.S. Agree Bilateral Relations 'Most Important'" *People's Daily Online* (in English), January 13, 2009. *http://english.people daily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6572553.html.*

47. David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2011).

48. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Propaganda and Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the*

United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, written testimony of Anne-Marie Brady, April 30, 2009; People's Republic of China State Council Information Office, *China's Peaceful Development Road* (government white paper on China's development goals) (Beijing, China: December 22, 2005). *http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222_230059.html;* and People's Republic of China State Council Information Office, *China's National Defense in 2010* (government white paper on China's defense policies) (Beijing, China: March 31, 2011). *http://news.xinhuanet.com/english 2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm.*

49. John Garver, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism," *China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993).

50. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), p. 8. Some PRC commentators have written that western governments and media have misunderstood aspects of the "24 Character Strategy," particularly the phrase "hide our capacities and bide our time." As stated in a 2010 essay posted on an official CCP website, "'Hide our capabilities and bide our time, make some contributions' and related thoughts, these were put forward by Deng Xiaoping for the 'special period' of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the midst of sudden changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the socialist camp. . . . Currently, there are people in other countries who have produced misunderstandings and distortions of 'hide our capabilities and bide our time.' These people believe that China's foreign policy strategy has a long-term, undeclared content and purpose: This is that China believes that its current strength is insufficient, and the time has not yet come to announce and implement this great strategy, and consequently must 'Hide our capabilities and bide our time,' concealing the true situation and waiting for the right time of opportunity. . . . However, this is . . . a serious misunderstanding and distortion of the 'hide our capabilities and bide our time' idea stated by Comrade Deng Xiaoping . . . the original idea of using the expression 'hide our capabilities and bide our time' was the strategy of 'developing ourselves,' and not at all to 'seek revenge on others' after we have developed." See Xiao Feng, "Was Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Idea of 'Hide Our Capabilities and Bide Our Time' a Measure of Expediency?" (*Deng Xiaoping Tongzhi de 'Tao Guang Yang Hui' Sixiang shi 'Quan Yi Zhi Ji' Ma?*) *Beijing Daily* (in Chinese), April 6, 2010. *http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/138903/141370/11297254.html.* Translation by USCC staff.

51. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), p. 8.

52. Gilbert Rozman, *Chinese Strategic Thought Toward Asia* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p. 3.

53. *Xinhuanet* (in English), "Backgrounder: Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," June 14, 2004. *http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm.*

54. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense), p. 8.

55. Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84: 5 (September-October 2005).

56. Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *China's Peaceful Development Road* (Beijing, China: December 22, 2005). Of note, President Hu's speech at the 2004 Boao Forum for Asia on Hainan Island was expected to reiterate the theme of "peaceful rise," but instead it emphasized a new narrative, "peaceful development." Robert L. Suttinger, "The Rise and Descent of 'Peaceful Rise'," *China Leadership Monitor* 12 (2004).

57. Hsin Pao, *Hong Kong Economic Journal* (January 27, 2006). OSC ID: CPP20060222904001. *http://www.opensource.gov;* and Zheng Bijian, "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* 84: 5 (September-October 2005): 18–24.

58. Robert L. Seuttinger, "The Rise and Descent of 'Peaceful Rise'," *China Leadership Monitor* 12 (2004).

59. Zheng Bijian, "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great Power Status," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2005).

60. Information Office of the State Council, *China's Peaceful Development Road* (Beijing, China: December 22, 2005). Note that the Information Office of the State Council has a dual identity and also functions as the CCP Office of Foreign Propaganda.

61. Information Office of the State Council, *China's Peaceful Development Road* (Beijing, China: December 22, 2005).

62. Robert L. Seuttinger, "The Rise and Descent of 'Peaceful Rise'," *China Leadership Monitor* 12 (2004).

63. For a summary of the CCP leadership's messages on this theme, see *People's Daily Online* (in English), "Hu Jintao Proposes Scientific Outlook on Development for Tackling China's Immediate Woes, Challenges," October 15, 2007. *http://english.peopledaily.com .cn/90001/6283112.html.*

64. Yiyi Lu, "The Collective Study Sessions of the Politburo: A Multipurpose Tool of China's Leadership," (Nottingham, United Kingdom: University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute, October 2007). For a discussion of the role of Politburo study sessions, see also Philip Saunders, "The Chinese Politburo Hits the Books" (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, *China Brief,* May 9, 2007).

65. China Central Television, homepage for the television series "The Rise of the Great Powers" (*Da Guo Jueqi*). *http://finance.cctv.com/special/C16860/01/index.shtml.*

66. For an illustrative discussion of how interpretations of the Warring States Period affect modern-day Chinese concepts of statecraft, see Wei Zongyou, "In the Shadow of Hegemony: Strategic Choices," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1: 2 (2006). For comment on the same phenomenon from an American perspective, see also Jacqueline Newmyer, "Oil, Arms, and Influence: The Indirect Strategy Behind Chinese Military Modernization," *Orbis* (Spring 2009).

67. For an example of an author making the comparison between a rising China and Imperial Germany, see John Mearsheimer's arguments in Zbigniew Brzezinski and John Mearscheimer, "Clash of the Titans," *Foreign Policy* 146 (January/February 2005) *http://mearsheimer. uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034.pdf;* and in John Mearscheimer, "Why China's Rise Will Not Be Peaceful," on-line essay dated September 17, 2004. *http://mearsheimer. uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf.* For a discussion of the concerns that Chinese leaders felt over such parallels, and their reactions to them, see Robert Sutter, "Debate on How to Deal with the United States" (paper presented at the conference "Chinese Leadership Differences," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, November 2, 2005). *http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_Revised.pdf.*

68. Ashley Tellis, "A Grand Chessboard," *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2005). *http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16540.*

69. *Asia Media,* "Full Transcript: Tom Plate and Jeffrey Cole interview Lee Kuan Yew" (Los Angeles, CA: University of California, Los Angeles International Institute, October 9, 2007). *http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=9541.*

70. Bonnie Glaser, "Ensuring that China Rises Peacefully" (Clingendael, The Netherlands: Institute of International Relations, December 23, 2010). *http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2010/20101223_CAF_artikel_BGlaser.pdf.*

71. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of David Lampton, March 10, 2011.

72. David Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2011); and Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, *New Foreign Policy Actors in China* (Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26, September 2010). *http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=410.*

73. For a discussion of the themes of "harmony" in PRC public diplomacy, see John Dotson, "The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government" (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, staff research report), July 20, 2011. *http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/Confucian_Revival_Paper.pdf.*

74. Wen Jiabao, "Getting to Know the Real China" (speech delivered at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, NY, September 23, 2010). Posted on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. *http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t761353.htm.*

75. Dai Bingguo, "Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development," *Beijing Review,* December 24, 2010.

76. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written testimony of John Park, March 10, 2011.

77. Li Keqiang, "The World Need Not Fear a Growing China," *Financial Times,* January 9, 2011.

78. Wang Jisi, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2011).

79. The themes in Mr. Wang's article closely mirror statements by senior Chinese leaders. Furthermore, Wang Jisi is a frequent commentator on foreign affairs, with a very prominent position as the dean of the School of International Studies

at Beijing University. Publishing a piece such as this, in a widely respected journal that is influential among English-speaking foreign policy circles, would almost certainly require political clearance by CCP authorities.

80. Michael Chase, "Chinese Suspicions and US Intentions," *Survival* 53:3 (June 2011); and John Lee, "China's America Obsession," *ForeignPolicy.com,* May 6, 2011. *http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/china_s_america_obsession?page=0,0.*

81. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written testimony of Gilbert Rozman, March 10, 2011.

82. AU.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written testimony of Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, March 10, 2011.

83. Author unknown, "Developing a New Understanding of the Communist Party at the Central Party School," January 17, 2011. *http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/01/developing-a-new-understanding-of-the-communist-party-at-a-party-school.* Translation by *China Digital Times* (Don Weinland) and USCC staff.

84. As noted in a 1998 propaganda handbook, officials should be careful when speaking with foreigners, "remembering that 'insiders and outsiders are different' and to be mindful of the need for secrecy." "*Shandong Sheng Duiwai Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huibian Ziliao 1992–1998*" (Shandong Province Foreign Propaganda Work Reference Materials 1992–1998), publisher unknown, Vol. 2 (1998), p. 1921. The work is cited in Anne-Marie Brady, *Marketing Dictatorship* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 161. For a discussion of the party's practices of suppressing information on certain issues while making reports on these same issues available to senior party officials, see He Qinglian, *The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China* (New York, NY: Human Rights in China, 2008), pp. 71–75.

85. "Like communist and revolutionary parties throughout history, formed and nurtured by underground cells and violent conflict with the regimes they sought to overthrow, the Party in China is secretive by habit and inclination." Richard McGregor, *The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2010), p. 20.

86. On the employment of "proactive" propaganda by the CCP, see David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy," *China Journal* 57 (January 2007). For a discussion of the suppression of negative news, see Ashley Esarey, "Speak No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China" (Washington, DC: Freedom House Special Report, February 2006). *http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/speciallreport/33.pdf.*

87. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, *China's New Rulers: The Secret Files* (New York, NY: The New York Review of Books, 2003), p. 233.

88. Yang Jiechi, "Strengthen Shanghai Spirit," *China Daily,* June 15, 2011. *http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-06/15/content_12698267.htm.*

89. *People's Daily Online* (in Chinese), "'Shanghai Jingshen' Zhangxian Wuxian Meili" (Displaying the Limitless Charm of the "Shanghai Spirit"), June 15, 2011. *http://world.people.com.cn/GB/57507/14910318.html.* Translation by USCC staff.

90. Richard Weitz, "Balancer-in-Chief: China Assumes SCO Chair," *China Brief,* July 1, 2011.

91. "Astana Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Shanghai Cooperation Organization statement issued in Astana, Kazakstan, June 15, 2011. *http://www.sco2011.kz/en/kzsco/inform.php.*

92. Wang Guosheng, "Comments and Analysis on China's Traditional Strategy of Defense," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science) 4 (2005); and *People's Daily Online* (in Chinese), "Peaceful Journey, Sowing Civilization: Commemorating the 600th Anniversary of the Voyages of Zheng He" (*Heping zhi Lu, Bosan Wenming—Jinian Zheng He Xia Xiang 600 Zhounian*), June 29, 2005. *http://www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/32313/32330/3506449.html.*

93. See the discussion of recent PRC propaganda treatment of the Zheng He narrative in John Dotson, "The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government" (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, staff research report), July 20, 2011. *http://www.uscc.gov/research papers/2011/Confucian_Revival_Paper.pdf.*

94. People's Republic of China State Council Information Office, *China's National Defense in 2010* (government white paper on China's defense policies) (Beijing, China: March 31, 2011). *http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm.*

95. "Chen Bingde," biographical entry at *ChinaVitae.com. http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Bingde/summary.*

96. Shirley A. Kan, "U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 2010), pp. 3–4.

97. Chen Bingde "Speech presented at the National Defense University" (Washington, DC, May 20, 2011). Notes taken by USCC staff.

98. According to scholar Michael Swaine, the term "core interests" appeared in articles in the *People's Daily* three times in 2003; 55 times in 2005; 95 times in 2008; 260 times in 2009; and 325 times in 2010. See Michael Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part One: On 'Core Interests'," *China Leadership Monitor* 34 (2011).

99. Comments made by Chinese academics in a roundtable discussion with members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, August 11, 2011.

100. Huai Chengbo, "How Do We Understand 'National Core Interests'?" (*Zenmo Lijie "Guojia Hexin Liyi"?*), *Qstheory.cn* (website of the official CCP theoretical journal *Qiushi*), January 25, 2011. *http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2011/201102/201101/t20110125_63092.htm.* Translation by USCC staff.

101. PRC State Councilor Dai Bingguo, remarks made at the closing of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Washington, DC, July 28, 2009. *http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126599.htm.* Chinese academics have cited Mr. Dai's remarks as the authoritative position of the CCP, as with comments made by Chinese academics in a roundtable discussion with members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, August 11, 2011.

102. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written testimony of John Park, March 10, 2011.

103. Greg Sheridan, "China Actions Meant as Test, Hillary Clinton Says," *Australian* (Sydney, Australia), November 9, 2010.

104. John Pomfret, "Beijing Claims 'Indisputable Sovereignty' Over South China Sea," *Washington Post,* July 31, 2010.

105. Edward Wong, "China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea Is a 'Core Interest' Worth War," *New York Times*, March 30, 2011. For commentary from a prominent PRC academic that seeks to downplay the significance of this controversy, see Wang Jisi, "A Rising Great Power Finds its Way," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2011).

106. Huai Chengbo, "How Do We Understand 'National Core Interests'?" (*Zenmo Lijie "Guojia Hexin Liyi"?*), *Qstheory.cn* (website of the official CCP theoretical journal *Qiushi*), January 25, 2011. *http://www.qstheory.cn/hqwg/2011/201102/201101/t20110125_63092.htm.*

107. John Milligan-Whyte and Dai Min, "Getting Tough or a New Era of Partnership?" *People's Daily Online* (in English), March 26, 2010. *http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/6932227.html.*

108. Comments by Hu Jintao made in Islamabad, Pakistan, on November 24, 2006, as cited in Michael Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part One: On 'Core Interests'," *China Leadership Monitor* 34 (2011).

109. Da Wei, "A Clear Signal of 'Core Interests' to the World," *China Daily*, August 2, 2010. http://*www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-08/02/content_11083124.htm.*

110. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written statement of Alison Kaufman ("The 'Century of Humiliation' and China's National Narratives"), March 10, 2011. For a statement by a paramount Chinese leader on the direct linkage between the history of imperialism and China's present-day circumstances, see Deng Xiaoping, "We Must Adhere To Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution Towards Capitalism" (excerpt from a conversation with Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania), November 23, 1989. From the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,* Vol. 3 (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 1994). *http://www.archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03_djvu.txt.*

111. "China is to a considerable extent a bargaining culture in which prior bargains are open for renegotiation whenever the underlying power positions, or broader circumstances, of the two (or more) parties shift. China, meaning its government and its people, has been chafing at some of the implicit or explicit bargains struck in the past with the United States, most notably regarding Taiwan, the U.S. military's close-in surveillance of the Mainland, visits to the White House by the Dalai Lama, vulnerability of the PRC's nuclear deterrent, and so forth. Now that China perceives itself stronger, and America and its allies on a trajectory of decreased dominance, it is no surprise Beijing is asking to 'renegotiate' the prior bargains it finds most unsatisfactory." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,

Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy, written testimony of David Lampton, March 10, 2011.

112. Wang Guosheng, "Comments and Analysis on China's Traditional Strategy of Defense," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science) 4 (2005).

113. Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

114. Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), p. V. *http://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf.*

115. Xiaoming Zhang, "China's 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment," *China Quarterly* 184 (December 2005). *http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/China G7<War_ With_Vietnam.pdf.*

116. Jay Solomon, "U.S. Takes on Maritime Spats," *Wall Street Journal,* July 24, 2010. *http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294904575384561458251130.html.*

117. See Australian Government Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Canberra, Australia: 2009). *http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf;* and Japanese Government Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2010* (Tokyo, Japan: 2010). *http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2010.html.*

118. Patrick Barta, "U.S., Vietnam in Exercises Amid Tensions with China," *Wall Street Journal,* July 16, 2011; and *Manila Times* (Philippines), "Spratlys Dispute Won't Affect PH–China Ties," July 18, 2011, *http://www.manilatimes.net/news/topstories/spratlys-dispute-won%E2%80%99t-affect-ph-china-ties-2/.*

119. Jim Garamone, "Cheonan Tragedy Strengthens U.S.-South Korea Alliance," *American Forces Press Service,* July 21, 2010; and Edward Luttwak, "The Guns of December," *ForeignPolicy.com,* December 21, 2010. *http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_guns_of_december?page=0,1.*

120. David Lai, "The Coming of Chinese Hawks" (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2010). *http://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1028.pdf.*

121. "Liu Yuan," biographical entry in *ChinaVitae.com. http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Liu_Yuan|4071.* In the early 1960s, Liu Shaoqi ranked second in the CCP hierarchy and was Mao Zedong's designated successor. However, the elder Mr. Liu was purged, and later died in prison, during the Cultural Revolution.

122. "Shaping history is particularly important to China's so-called princelings . . . having secured influence and often wealth on the basis of their family's connections, members of this small but powerful group celebrate a wart-free version of the past that boosts their status—and sidesteps their parents' role as enforcers and then victims of party brutality." Andrew Higgins, "The Party Line on Party History," *Washington Post,* May 27, 2011.

123. John Garnaut, "Chinese General Rattles Sabre," *The Age* (Australia), May 23, 2011; and Andrew Higgins, "The Party Line on Party History," *Washington Post,* May 27, 2011.

124. Liu Yan, excerpts from text as cited in *Renminwang* (*People's Daily Online*), "*Liu Shaoqi de Zi Liu Yuan Shangjiang: Hebu Mingzhengyanshun, Lizhiqizhuang de Juqi Xin Minzhu Zhuyi?"* (Liu Shaoqi's Son General Liu Yuan: Why Aren't We Perfectly Justified in Upholding New Democracy?), May 16, 2011. *http://blog.163.com/lsz8720@126/blog/static/138019571201141674446665/.* Translation by USCC staff.

125. Willy Ho-Lap Lam, "The Death of Factions within the Chinese Communist Party?" *China Brief* 11:9 (May 20, 2011); Willy Ho-Lap Lam, "Hu Revives Quasi-Maoist Tactics to Stem Social Instability," *China Brief* 10:20 (October 8, 2010); and Willy Ho-Lap Lam, "Chinese Leaders Revive Marxist Orthodoxy," *China Brief* 10:9 (April 29, 2010).

126. John Garnaut, "Chinese General Rattles Sabre," *The Age* (Australia), May 23, 2011.

127. Liu Yan, excerpts from text as cited in *Renminwang* (*People's Daily Online*), *"Liu Yuan: Hebu Mingzhengyanshun, Lizhiqizhuang de Juqi Xin Minzhu Zhuyi?"* (Liu Yuan: Why Aren't We Perfectly Justified in Upholding New Democracy?), May 16, 2011. *http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/14651911.html.* Translation by USCC staff.

128. Willy Lam, "The Military Maneuvers of Xi Jinping," *Wall Street Journal,* Journal 26, 2011. *http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704698004576103513580674214.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.*

129. Paul Eckert, "Sizing Up China's Next Leader," Reuters News Service, February 17, 2011. *http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/01/XiJinping.pdf.* See also Peter Foster, "WikiLeaks: China's Politburo a Cabal of Business Empires," *Tele-*

graph (United Kingdom), December 6, 2010. *http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8184216/WikiLeaks-Chinas-Politburo-a-cabal-of-business-empires.html;* and Malcolm Moore, "Light Cast on the Man China's Censors Have Been Trying to Hide," *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), January 5, 2011. *http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/light-cast-on-the-man-chinas-censors-have-been-trying-to-hide-20110104-19f2t.html.*

130. Warren Sun (professor at Monash University) as quoted in John Garnaut, "China's Party Princelings Fight for a Chance to Go Back to the Future," *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), May 24, 2011. *http://www.smh.com.au/business/chinas-party-princelings-fight-for-a-chance-to-go-back-to-the-future-20110523-1f0pu.html.*

131. Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (STRATFOR), "Former President's Son on Track for a Powerful Military Position," July 23, 2011; and Willy Lam, "The Military Maneuvers of Xi Jinping," *Wall Street Journal,* January 26, 2011. *http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704698004576103513580674214.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.*

132. In recent years, the CCP Central Military Commission has had either ten or 11 members, normally consisting of: a chairman (the civilian CCP paramount leader, currently Hu Jintao); two uniformed vice chairmen, one a political commissar and the other a line officer (currently General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong, respectively); at some times, another civilian vice chairman (the CCP heir apparent leader, currently Xi Jinping); the heads of the four PLA general departments (Staff, Political, Logistics, Armaments); and the heads of the four PLA service branches (army, navy, air force, and Second Artillery). The current PRC defense minister, General Liang Guanglie, also sits on the Central Military Commission, apparently providing dual representation for the Defense Ministry and for the ground forces.

133. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives on National Security Policy,* written testimony of Gilbert Rozman, March 10, 2011. This tendency is particularly true of books published by senior officers through military publishing houses, which frequently include strident language and predictions of inevitable conflict with the United States. Such writings do not reflect official policy, but they do reveal intense nationalist feeling and hostility to the United States within elements of the military as well as a receptive commercial audience for such ideas. See Chris Buckley, "China PLA Officer Urges Challenging U.S. Dominance," Reuters, February 28, 2010; and Peter Brown, "The PLA Raises Its Voice," *Asia Times,* March 8, 2010.

134. John Pomfret, "In Chinese Admiral's Outburst, a Lingering Distrust of U.S.," *Washington Post*, June 8, 2010.

135. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of Abraham Denmark, March 10, 2011.

136. For a discussion of this and other potential explanations for PLA nationalist commentary, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* written testimony of Andrew Scobell, March 10, 2011; and Andrew Scobell, "Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China's Peaceful Rise?" *Parameters* (Summer 2009).

137. Willy Lam, "The Military Maneuvers of Xi Jinping," *Wall Street Journal,* January 26, 2011. *http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704698004576103513580674214.tml?mod=googlenews_wsj.K*

138. Website of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, "The Sino-American Security Dialogue." *http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/index. htm;* and Peter Gries (University of Oklahoma) e-mail communication with Commission staff, October 13–14, 2011.

139. For only three examples out of many that could be cited: the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs is subordinate to the PRC Foreign Ministry, and the China Association for International Understanding is subordinate to the CCP International Department [see David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy," *China Journal* 57 (January 2007)]; and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR, is subordinate to the PRC Ministry of State Security (Open Source Center, "Profile of MSS–Affiliated PRC Foreign Policy Think Tank CICIR," August 25, 2011. *www.opensource.gov.)*

140. As an example, see the discussion of appointments to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *2008 Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), p. 292.

141. According to Dr. David Shambaugh of The George Washington University, "[i]t appears that [the China Association for International Friendly Contact] is

linked to the Intelligence Bureau of the Liaison Department of the PLA's General Political Department . . . [with additional] ties to both the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." [See David Shambaugh, "China's International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process," *China Quarterly* 171 (September 2002).] In addition to serving as "a front for inviting and meeting with selected foreigners in China," the China Association for International Friendly Contact has also served as a vehicle "for sending active-duty intelligence collectors abroad under various kinds of cover." [See David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p. 136]. For further commentary on the role of the GPD/LD [Liaison Department] and the China Association for International Friendly Contact in sending agents abroad, see also Howard DeVore, *China's Intelligence and Internal Security Forces* (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1999), pp. 50–51; and Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 103–104.

142. The International Liaison Department of the PLA General Political Department has traditionally borne responsibility for conducting propaganda and psychological operations directed at other militaries. [See Howard DeVore, *China's Intelligence and Internal Security Forces* (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1999), p. 50–51; and Interagency OPSEC [Operational Security] Support Staff, *Intelligence Threat Handbook* (2004), p. 23. *http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/handbook/foreign.pdf.*] The Liaison Department conducts its perception management operations in accordance with centrally determined CCP propaganda narratives: As stated in the mid-1990s by Nicholas Eftimiades, an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, "[P]olitical-military propaganda against foreign forces is a national function under the purview of the GPD's [General Political Department] liaison department. Implementation of a specific theme of disinformation must somehow advance national policy objectives. It is therefore probable that the GPD formulates propaganda in accordance with [Central Military Commission] military and policy decisions. Such campaigns are then implemented through the PLA's overt and intelligence channels under the supervision of political commissars." [See Nicholas Eftimiades, *Chinese Intelligence Operations* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 92–93.]

143. Survey performed by USCC staff of the international exchanges listed on the CAIFC website for the years 2009–2010. The list is not exhaustive but instead shows a selected number of more prominent exchange activities. See Website of the China Association for International Friendly Contact. *http://www.caifc.org.cn.* Material translated by USCC staff.

144. The Center for Peace and Development shares office space with the CAIFC in a compound in the northern part of Beijing. The institute conducts exchanges with foreign academics and events with government officials and also publishes its own bimonthly journal on foreign affairs, eponymously titled *Peace and Development.* For a discussion of the connection between CAIFC and CPD, see David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p. 136. Brief profiles of recent CPD exchanges with foreign academics and Chinese government officials may be found in the website of the Center for Peace and Development, "Scholarly Exchange Activities." *http://www.caifc.org.cn/qk.aspx.* Lists of tables of contents from selected issues of *Peace and Development,* and abstracts of the articles, may be found on *China National Knowledge Infrastructure On-Line,* profile for *Peace and Development. http://www.acad.cnki.net/Kns55/oldnavi/n_item.aspx?NaviID=1&BaseID=HPFZ &NaviLink=.*

145. The "Sanya Initiative" is a series of track two dialogues between retired, senior-ranking flag officers of the U.S. and Chinese armed forces. On the Chinese side, the initiative is hosted by the China Association for International Friendly Contact. The exchanges commenced in February 2008 with meetings in Beijing and in the city of Sanya, on Hainan Island. The Sanya Initiative dialogues are not official military-to-military exchanges conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense.

146. For two such examples, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* testimonies of John Park and Abraham Denmark, March 10, 2011.

147. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *Hearing on China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,* testimony of Abraham Denmark, March 10, 2011.

148. Michael Pillsbury, "China's Research Institutes" (paper written on behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 2001). *http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/cri.pdf.*

149. Open Source Center, "Profile of MSS [Ministry of State Security]–Affiliated PRC Foreign Policy Think Tank CICIR," August 25, 2011. *www.opensource. gov.*