>

JULY 2002 - REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S. - CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION - THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

Chapter 4 - Political and Civil Freedoms

Key Findings

  • In the past twenty years there have been some improvements in social and personal freedoms for the Chinese people. However, trade and economic liberalization have not led to the extent of political liberalization much hoped for by U.S. policymakers. The Chinese Government has simultaneously increased trade and aggressively resisted openness in politically sensitive areas such as the exercise of religious, human, and worker rights.

  • To facilitate trade and investment, China has instituted numerous legal reforms that deal with foreign direct investment (FDI), financial markets, and private businesses. The development of a legal structure to implement China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments faces a host of challenges such as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control of the courts, a weak judiciary system marked by a lack of trained judges and a flawed judicial appointment system, local and provincial protectionism, and widespread corruption.

  • The Chinese Government has implemented limited reforms in administrative law and civil procedures. Nevertheless, its citizens suffer from errant, arbitrary, and sometimes brutal treatment by the government.

  • The Chinese Government systematically denies workers the freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to strike. Exploitative child labor and forced labor are commonplace. In recent years, workers and union organizers have protested these conditions, but such protests are often defused by payoffs or suppressed by intimidation and brute force, while emergent labor leaders and others have been jailed or sent to mental institutions. The government seems determined to quash any independent workers’ organizations.

  • The central government seeks to effectively control the free flow of information from the Internet to the traditional media.

Introduction

Successive American administrations have argued that letting Western influences permeate China through trade and investment would erode the legitimacy of the government’s one-party, authoritarian rule and foster the development of a rules-based society. Prominent U.S. officials, such as former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, have argued that a normal trading relationship with China would lead to a more liberal, more democratic China.1

In the past two decades Chinese citizens have gained some social and personal freedoms, such as the freedom to travel, to choose their own professions, and to associate with friends of their choice. However, the government has not permitted political liberalization and continues to repress any independent groups. Having fostered a more complex and diverse society where media criticism, popular protest, and religious objection can no longer be wholly monitored or controlled, Beijing now resorts to official intimidation, false propaganda, and brute force to suppress dissent when necessary.

The Chinese Government’s flagrant abuse of human rights is not only morally repugnant, but it also concretely damages U.S. interests. China’s export of goods made by prison labor and its suppression of labor rights damage U.S. economic competitiveness. Its disregard for the rule of law hinders proper compliance with WTO commitments. Its efforts to control the media and the Internet, and to sponsor computer "hacker" activism against U.S. institutions are a cause for concern. Its media apparatus promotes disinformation and adverse views about the United States among its citizenry.

Further, China’s policies and actions in other political areas, ranging from suppression of religious freedom, to village elections, to Hong Kong, suggest that economic liberalization might not lead to political liberalization.

Legal Reforms

Since 1979, China has instituted numerous legal reforms to spur foreign investment and economic modernization. In the process, China has facilitated varied commercial activities, recognized new commercial rights and interests, promulgated industry regulations, and legitimized and built the basic infrastructure for an expanding market economy.

The government has begun to reform state-owned enterprises, the banking and tax systems, and the securities markets, in order to create a market economy that will inspire the confidence of foreign investors. To that end, China has set forth and revised criminal and civil law, strengthened institutions to curb administrative arbitrariness, reformed and reconstructed the court system, and resurrected the study of law and the legal profession.2

Nevertheless, an independent, impartial legal system is lacking. The current legal structure is plagued by Party intervention, glaring corruption, and arbitrariness. An expanding and increasingly more expert class of legal professionals has not changed the fact that the judiciary remains subservient to Party interests. These and other problems continue to leave Chinese citizens without adequate legal recourse and vulnerable to the whims of errant government policies.

Legal reforms in China to date have been implemented mainly to further economic growth rather than to promote a genuine rule of law under which the state itself would be subjected and limited by the law. Instead, the Chinese legal system is characterized by the rule by law, where the state employs the law as a vehicle to exercise power when convenient or necessary for its own ends.3

The United States now depends on this flawed legal system, under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party, to enforce China’s WTO commitments.

 

Commercial Legal Reform

China will have to comply with three basic legal requirements placed on all WTO members. These are:

    1. Transparency of relevant laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings of general application;

    2. Uniform, impartial, and reasonable administration of such legal norms; and

    3. Institutions that guarantee independent, objective, and impartial review of all relevant administrative actions.

China will have to publish and make easily available all laws, regulations, and administrative rulings; establish an inquiry point within the central government where complaints can be lodged and addressed swiftly, and establish institutions that guarantee objective and impartial review of all relevant administrative actions.

Aside from complying with the general requirements placed on WTO members, China must also bring its domestic laws into compliance with all of its WTO obligations. It must legislate, abolish, or amend literally thousands of laws. To that end, China has already undertaken massive efforts to revise existing laws and regulations relating to trade and investment, technology transfer, banking, insurance, securities, taxation, customs, intellectual property, telecommunications, health and professional services.4

However, glaring problems stand in the way of China’s commercial legal reforms. For one, the dissemination of new regulations is likely to be a slow process as provincialism and local protectionism deflect or frustrate the central government’s directives at all levels of the administrative and legal structures. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) has on numerous occasions had to renegotiate agreements to include enforcement provisions or "action plans" for the Chinese Government to enforce laws in the localities. Such enforcement problems will likely be the cause of many disputes and will place the onus on Chinese courts to review and rule on administrative action or future inaction.

Weak Judiciary

Legal professionals in China are poorly trained and the legal system is unduly influenced by the CCP. Despite progress made in the training of judges, many remain poorly educated. Today, only about 10 percent of China’s judges have four-year college degrees in law.5

Judges do not have a limited tenure of office and are, by and large, appointed, promoted, compensated, and removed by the local party and government elite. Moreover, the courts are under the control of the local Party Political-Legal Committee, which oversees the courts as well as the local prosecutor’s office, police and justice department. Over 90 percent of the country’s approximately 180,000 judges are CCP members.6 As a result, local protectionism and provincialism thwarts true independence of China’s judiciary.

Corruption

Systemic corruption in China today not only plagues almost every htmect of society and hinders overall economic development, but is also a major stumbling block to the creation of an impartial legal system that can enforce China’s WTO compliance.

China reportedly has the largest dollar amount of corruption of any other country in the world.7 Some estimate the cost of corruption to China’s economy at 2-3 percent of GDP.8 Hu Angang, a noted economist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Qinghua University in Beijing, estimates that corruption in China from 1999-2001 averaged an annual rate of 14.5-14.9 percent of GDP and that 15-20 percent of public projects funds "leak" into private hands.9

The legal system in China is mired in corruption much like the rest of the economy. Judges, who are usually underpaid and treated like other political officials, are easily susceptible to corruption.10 Lawyers are known to use social or Party connections and bribes to win cases. As a result, the courts in China often do not render judgment based on legal merit but are influenced by payoffs and political manipulation.11 Even when corrupt government officials are caught, criminal courts sentence only 6.6 percent of them.12

Although China’s leaders have declared the fight against corruption a central policy objective, they have had little success. Many Chinese scholars have stated that capital flight actually increases proportionately to the degree which the government increases anti-corruption efforts.13 Some government officials and scholars contend that anti-corruption campaigns in fact have been hijacked by various government officials to advance political interests or wage political fights rather than to make substantive reforms.14

Noncommercial Legal Reforms

China has implemented some noncommercial legal reforms in administrative law, criminal law, and the National People’s Congress (NPC).

In the area of administrative law, the central leadership has put in place reforms to establish the basis of judicial review of state actions. The 1989 Administrative Litigation Law, an attempt to foster bureaucratic responsibility, permitted affected parties to sue administrative agencies for alleged illegal application of administrative rules. The 1994 State Compensation Law allows citizens to sue the state for a variety of perceived infractions or excesses; the 1996 Administrative Penalties Law limits the power of officials to administer penalties and punishments and lays out principles of transparency, legitimacy and due process for administering such penalties.15

Criminal law and procedure remain the least reformed areas of Chinese law, with arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture still common.16 The 1996 revised Criminal Procedure Law outlined a framework for key areas from pre-trial detention to the right to counsel. In practice, police often use loopholes in the law to circumvent a defendant’s right to counsel; criminal defense lawyers frequently have trouble getting access to their clients or collecting evidence; and law enforcement officials threaten and harass lawyers. In addition, there is no right to remain silent, no presumption of innocence, no right against double jeopardy and no law of evidence.17

Traditionally, the NPC has served as a rubber stamp of CCP edicts. Over the past two decades, the NPC has taken a more active role in originating and passing legislation while engaging in more contentious debates on legislative initiatives.18 Nevertheless, the NPC today is far from being an independent organ that can provide checks and balances on Party rule.

Rule of Law Initiatives

U.S. nongovernmental organizations, universities and government agencies have been funding rule of law initiatives in China that address important legal infrastructure needs, ranging from legal training to legislation drafting to technical assistance. While rule of law initiatives could help foster legal reform, they may not necessarily lead to democratic change or even political liberalization. As long as the CCP remains above the law, legal reform could be used merely to advance the Party’s interests, such as building up China’s economic power while controlling dissent. An improved commercial rule of law without political reform might help a regime unfriendly to the United States attract trade, investment, and wealth more effectively.

Prison Labor Exports

China operates the largest prison/forced labor camp system in the world; it is known to produce goods destined for the United States. and international markets. The import of such products affects not only Chinese citizens but also the U.S. economy, as workers in labor camps make such low wages that American workers simply cannot compete.19

U.S. laws banning the import of prison labor goods seek to protect U.S. businesses, consumers and laborers from unfair foreign competition. Section 1307 of Title 19, U.S. Code (Section 307 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930) prohibits the importation of prison or forced labor products from any country. Section 1761 of Title 18, U.S. Code, makes it a criminal offense to knowingly import or transport in interstate commerce convict labor goods. As early as 1989, the U.S. Government expressed concerns about the entry of such products into the U.S. market from China.20 However, U.S. efforts to monitor or stem the influx of these forced labor exports have largely been unsuccessful due to the lack of cooperation from the Chinese Government.

Human rights groups such as the Laogai Research Foundation contend there are over 1,000 labor camps in China and that prison labor goods make up an important part of the Chinese national economy. A study conducted by Dunn & Bradstreet documented 99 such prison labor facilities, which together produce over $800 million in domestic and international sales each year.21

Chinese law mandates that prisoners can be required to work up to 12 hours per day. Former prisoners and credible sources, however, have reported that work requirements often exceed those set forth by the law, especially under circumstances where the penal institutions derive economic benefits from prison labor.22 Those who perform prison labor include not only criminals, but also many political, religious and labor dissidents who are forced to undergo "re-education through labor."

As of August 2001, U.S. Customs had undertaken approximately 84 criminal investigations of prison labor in China and had issued 20 detention orders for goods entering the United States from Chinese facilities that were believed to be prison camps.23 However, the U.S. Customs Service to date has substantiated only three allegations of forced labor imports from China into the United States. They involved:24

  • E.W. Bliss Company of Hastings, Michigan, which in 1992 pled guilty to charges of knowingly importing machine presses made with prison labor;

  • China Diesel Imports, which imported diesel engines produced by the Yunnan Machinery Company of China, was found to have used prison labor in its manufacturing process; and

  • Office Mate International Corporation of Edison, New Jersey, and its sister company Allied International Manufacturing Corporation (AIMCO), of Nanjing China, whose owner was convicted of transporting over a hundred million paper binder clips made from prison labor into the United States. (According to the Laogai Research Foundation, such imports amounted to at least one-third of all binder clips available in the United States).25

 

The U.S. Customs Service has required a collection of evidence beyond reasonable suspicion to issue a detention order to block forced labor goods from entering the U.S. border or to prosecute a violating importer. Once a detention order is issued, it remains in effect until Customs is able to make a clear determination that the facility in question is not utilizing prison labor.26 Because detention orders are issued with an eye toward a potential court challenge by the accused, Customs must have the ability to gather strong evidence to support its claim. In the case of China, Customs would like to inspect the alleged forced labor facility to confirm that the barred products were indeed goods produced from forced labor.

To investigate, prevent and stop the importation of forced labor products from China, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Prohibiting Trade in Prison Labor Products with China in 1992 to gain access to suspect prison facilities, with Chinese permission. A subsequent bilateral agreement, the Statement of Cooperation on the Memorandum, was signed in 1994 to specify the timeline of "visits" requested by Washington.

According to the U.S. Department of State, Chinese cooperation in carrying out the two agreements has been at best "sporadic."27 China for the most part has either rejected or left standing U.S. requests to inspect alleged Chinese prison labor facilities. Between 1997 and the end of 2001, Beijing allowed U.S. officials to conduct only one visit to a suspected prison labor facility. As of the end of 2001, eight U.S. requests for prison visits, some dating back to 1992, were pending.28

China has argued that its "re-education through labor" facilities are administrative rather than penal in nature and therefore are not covered by the two bilateral agreements. In instances when the relevant facilities are conceded to be prisons, China has claimed that the products are not exported to the United States.

In 2000, the Chinese Ministry of Justice further indicated its unwillingness to cooperate with the United States in implementing the two bilateral agreements. In a statement, the Ministry recommended that the U.S. Customs Service cease its requests for "visits" to suspect prison labor facilities, claiming that it was the "sovereign right of the Chinese Government to investigate claims of forced labor without U.S. interference."

Without Chinese cooperation, U.S. Customs cannot effectively investigate these alleged forced labor facilities. As China abuses its criminal and political prisoners, it is simultaneously hindering the effective enforcement of bilateral agreements and of domestic U.S. laws. The Commission recommends that Congress implement steps to more effectively prohibit the importation of goods made by prison and forced labor from China. (See appendix for a letter and recommendations the Commission released to Congress in May 2002.)

Labor Rights

The existence of free trade unions and advancement of worker rights are essential to the development of a free and liberal society in China. However, the Chinese Government systematically denies workers the freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to strike. Horrid working conditions abound, where workers face depressed wages, long hours, accidental amputations, and death from over-exhaustion. Often, they are also unable to collect fair compensation, or to seek legal redress or grievances. Labor activists who protest or attempt to organize independent trade unions are regularly detained in prisons or psychiatric hospitals. The cheap labor costs have in part contributed to the redirection of American investment and relocation of manufacturing plants, leading to job losses and decreasing economic competitiveness in the American economy.

Although China is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), it has largely ignored its commitments to comply with ILO standards regarding the freedom of association. Only one union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), whose officials are appointed by and answer to the CCP, operates legally.

Aside from lacking appropriate union representation, Chinese workers also suffer the costs of the nation’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. In the cities, privatization of ailing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the past few years have led to massive layoffs. In an urban workforce of roughly 200 million, 15 million workers are estimated to have lost their jobs as a result of this downsizing.29 The combination of layoffs and poor working conditions have led to frequent protests by disgruntled or unemployed workers across China. Large-scale protests in northeastern China in early 2002 demonstrate the volatility and seriousness of massive labor discontent in China.

Away from the state-owned sector, most Chinese workers are not even represented by the official union. The ACFTU has had little success in organizing workers in the burgeoning private sector, where union membership in 2001 is estimated to be less than 20 percent.30 In the countryside, the rural workforce of some 550 million people--along with some 100 million migrants in the "floating population" that leaves the countryside to seek employment in the cities–for the most part do not have union representation.31

Without the right to organize and bargain collectively and the right to strike, some workers have attempted to address their grievances in the courts. China has shown a willingness to allow legal aid clinics to take labor and employment law cases and permits private lawyers to represent mistreated workers including those injured in industrial accidents. Existing labor laws do outline standards ranging from compensation to overtime; however, most workers do not know their rights under the law. Those who do and have brought their grievances to the courts are often frustrated by unfair determinations made based on personal and political influence rather than the law.32

The American business community in China claims that it contributes greatly to the improvement of social, labor, and environmental conditions by promoting the rule of law, ethical business behavior and new ideas.33 Labor and human rights communities, however, have accused American companies in China of taking advantage of and prolonging human and labor rights abuses by paying subsistence wages and punishing workers who seek to strike or raise grievances.34

Ultimately, the denial of workers’ rights and poor working conditions in China has a depressing effect on the wages of American workers, who do not accept the extremely low standards Chinese workers tolerate.35 In part because of low labor costs, artificially depressed by the deprivation of workers’ rights, China has managed to become competitive in various industries at U.S. expense. For instance, China today produces more steel than any other country in the world despite the poor quality of its products and the low productivity of its workforce.36

Free Flow of Information

The development and liberalization of information-based industries such as the Internet and the media has been widely expected to facilitate the influx of foreign ideas and information sources, and even encourage citizens to demand rule of law and democracy. Hopes for political liberalization, however, have yet to be realized.

Internet

The Internet industry has served as a powerful engine of growth for the Chinese economy since 1998.The information technology sector has grown at three times the rate of the overall Chinese economy as of early 2001.37 Much of this growth has been driven by the burgeoning Chinese Internet population, which doubled every six months for much of the last few years and ballooned from 2.1 million at the beginning of 1999 to 33.7 million in December 2001.38 China has approved the momentous breakup of monopoly giant China Telecommunications, encouraged Internet growth by slashing telecom rates for online access, and built a vast fiber-optic network to improve national connectivity.

Beijing has also aggressively clamped down on what it considers to be online subversive thought as well as efforts by dissident groups such as the banned Falun Gong spiritual sect and the China Democratic Party to communicate and organize via the web.

Via its firewall controls, Beijing blocks access to Chinese and Western websites it finds disagreeable. Internet users often manage to access many blocked sites via proxy servers and alternative networks, sometimes using software and solutions offered by foreign entities. The government is aggressively battling the influence of such technologies and persistently tries to debilitate the overseas servers that help Chinese citizens access the World Wide Web.39

In addition, press reports indicate that Beijing is relying on products from Western IT companies to help rein in what Beijing considers as subversion on the web. Such reports allege that companies have provided technologies that, while legal under the existing U.S. export regulations, have nevertheless aided the Chinese Government in sensitive areas such as remote surveillance, online censorship, and virus acquisition.40

To complement controlling the web via technology, Beijing has also passed sweeping Internet regulations in the past two years prohibiting non-state sanctioned news and commentary. Internet content and service providers are required to maintain detailed records about their users, install software to record email messages sent and received, and send copies of any emails that violate PRC regulations to the relevant government agencies. Internet cafes have been forced to install filtering software that blocks or deletes sensitive web content. Individuals seeking to spread democracy on the web have been arrested; websites that publish news and commentary that criticize the government have been fined or closed; Internet cafes that do not properly catch their users’ online activities or filter out inappropriate sites have been warned or shut down.

Public security organs in the past two years have reportedly engaged in a massive recruiting effort for computer technicians to enhance the Internet police force, which has become the most important police branch inside the public security system in China.41 In April 2002, Beijing reaffirmed its resolve for Internet control when top public security officials declared that it was key to national security and social stability and that public security organs at all levels should carry out an "Internet struggle" to control the web.42

Beijing has successfully convinced some American Internet companies such as Yahoo! to comply with its regulations and aid online censorship.43 America Online, in a joint venture with China’s Legend Computers to develop a web portal, has not eliminated the option of turning over the names, emails or records of political dissidents if the Chinese Government demands them.44

Even as China increases its control of the web with regulations and Western vendors’ assistance, its efforts are largely implemented by self-censorship."45 Because all commercial websites must seek government licenses for business operation, cooperation with the authorities is crucial. Most major content providers dutifully self-censor content by deleting messages, warning users and blocking entry points to more sensitive sites. Websites that fail to comply may face punishment ranging from extraordinary fines to business closure.46

Chinese entrepreneurs view government censorship as only a necessary nuisance, stressing that censorship is a fact of life. Without their willful collaboration, it would be impossible for the government to monitor the multitude of information available on today’s Chinese web. As one Chinese Internet executive put it, "The point is to make profits, not political statements."47

While keen to control online content, the Chinese Government is also eager to develop Internet strategies and technologies that could be used in information warfare against the United States. Chinese hackers, encouraged or at least not discouraged by the government, have made no pretense about their interest in debilitating the U.S. financial, business or government networks.48 Other Internet users, much to the embarrassment of the government, have used the Internet medium to spread anti-American vitriol, as they did immediately after September 11.

Traditional Media

The state media has experienced further openness due to commercialization and the growth of advertising in the past two decades.49 Non-official books, television stations and newspapers have proliferated throughout the country.50 The sheer volume of available materials makes official censorship difficult, especially for smaller regional and provincial publications. In addition, many publishing houses and media sources, though still state owned, have adopted a more market-oriented approach to shaping public opinions.

However, Beijing continues to enforce its censorship guidelines by incentives for self-censorship and official intimidation. While repression may have decreased over the last decade, its methods and repressive nature have remained.51 Editors and journalists are still evaluated for promotions and given fringe benefits according to how well they adhere to the Party line.52 Scholars and writers operate under a "dull, well-entrenched leeriness" of censorship, grimly aware that politically incorrect speech might result in punishments such as the loss of employment, imprisonment, torture, or estrangement from family.53

Where self-censorship fails, the government takes action against dissenting authors or liberal media sources with a high profile. Popular publications regularly face temporary shutdowns, forced dismissal of editors, and closure of online chat rooms due to criticisms of the government.

Beijing attempts to thwart new ways of greater media access. For instance, the spread of home satellite dishes in the 1990s has allowed many Chinese households to view alternative television programs. Earlier this year, the State Administration of Film, Radio and Television (SARFT) attempted to limit the reception of satellite television programs and ordered the dismantling of satellite dishes in Beijing and other major cities where the dishes have been erected without official authorization.54 The SARFT is currently planning to create a uniform satellite platform, from which all foreign satellite programs will be broadcast from a Chinese controlled satellite to a Chinese audience that has been authorized to receive foreign television programs.55

While China wants to control the media for propaganda purposes, it also has economic motives. The commercialization of the media has made it a lucrative business, and the government is eager to take advantage of rising advertising revenues. For instance, China Central Television (CCTV) garnered some US$662 million in advertising revenue in 2000, far outstripping the $3.6 million that the government contributed to CCTV.56 Refusal to liberalize the media industry then serves as a means to protect potential profits. Foreign investments in the Chinese media industry must leave the controlling stake to the state and abide by the government’s regulations on content examination.

In late 2001, Beijing presented an appearance of openness when it granted News Corp., AOL Time Warner and Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV limited permission to transmit programming into Guangdong Province. Critics have argued that this sign of openness has little substantive value, as many residents already receive signals to foreign programming from nearby Hong Kong. In addition, AOL Time Warner and News Corp. promised to ensure U.S. access for the state-run English language channel CCTV-9, and may in the end give Chinese Government propaganda a much-desired audience overseas.57

Despite the commercialization and diversification of traditional media in China, it remains a vehicle of propaganda for the central government. Beijing’s efforts to control the free flow of information reflect its broader approach to maintain political stability while modernizing the overall economy. The Internet and the media, both of which have tremendous potential to further social and political openness, instead have been employed to suppress political dissidence and when convenient, to criticize the United States. (See Chapter 1 for further discussion of the Chinese media.)

Other Civil and Political Freedoms

China ’s actions in the legal, labor, Internet, and media realms are all the more troubling in light of the regime’s harsh treatment of its own citizens across the board. For instance, China abuses ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, enforces coerced abortions on women to carry out the one-child policy, and persecutes religious believers and political dissidents.

Most notably, the nation-wide crackdown on the pseudo-Buddhist sect Falun Gong since 1999 has revealed to the world the ugly, authoritarian side of the Chinese Government that remains unchanged after two decades of economic reform. The central government has dismissed, imprisoned, convicted, sent to reeducation-through-labor camps, confined to mental hospitals, and/or brain washed a vast majority of the Falun Gong believers.58 Detained believers have been subjected to regular beatings and extreme torture. According to various sources, approximately 200 Falun Gong members have died in police custody since the crackdown began.59

Although Chinese citizens can and do worship in various state-sanctioned facilities and institutions, Beijing has regularly unleashed its security apparatus on other religious believers, such as Protestants who meet in house churches not directly under government control, Roman Catholics who pledge their allegiance to the Pope, Tibetan Buddhists, and Muslim Uighurs who are considered to be advocating independence for their respective autonomous regions. The government has systematically planned and implemented measures that would suppress religious dissent and have even advocated more clandestine methods for suppression because outright crackdowns prove to be cumbersome and not always effective.60

Chinese citizens can do little about the abuses they face, especially since they do not enjoy the right to vote out their political leaders. When China began experimenting with village elections in 1987, it raised hopes in the West that the country was on a path toward democracy. In 1998, the National People’s Congress even passed the Organic Law on Village Elections, which requires that village chairmen and village committees be chosen by direct, competitive elections in all of the country’s approximately 1 million villages.61

Though a majority of the provinces have carried out village elections, many of the elections suffer from serious procedural flaws. While Party members have been defeated at some elections, the CCP still dominates the local electoral process. Roughly 60 percent of the members elected to the village committees are Party members.62

While there are efforts to introduce elections on the township level, they are not necessarily a precursor for democracy in China. The elections, as currently instituted, do not undermine the power of the Communist Party or limit its draconian policies.63

When Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997, many had hoped that mainland China would be positively influenced by Hong Kong’s liberal society based on a rule of law. Though Hong Kong today remains one of the freest cities in Asia, disturbing signs of Beijing’s attempt to interfere in its internal affairs regularly emerge. Some of the most notable incidents have included: the National People’s Congress’ overruling of the Court of Final Appeals (CFA), Hong Kong’s highest court, in its first major constitutional decision under Chinese rule in June 1999; warning from the Mainland’s top official in Hong Kong to the local media to refrain from broadcasting views and speeches about Taiwan independence as normal news items in March 2000; warning from another mainland official not to trade with Taiwanese businessmen who advocate independence in May 2000; and the re-election in 2002 of Chief Executive C.H. Tung, who was backed by Beijing and was confirmed by an 800-member committee that answers to China.64 China today remains a place where freedom does not prevail.

National Security Implications

China’s systemic, draconian suppression of political, labor and religious dissent in recent years reveals that the blossoming of trade has not deterred the government from maintaining its authoritarian grip on power. Instruments that could be used to promote liberalization, like the Internet and the media, are being used by the government to promote the interests of the Party.

Recommendations:

  • Enforcement against the import of prison labor goods from China should be improved by shifting the burden of proof from the U.S. Government to companies that import such goods into the United States. Such companies would be required to certify, based on good faith efforts, that the products they are importing are not made by forced or prison labor. The Commission made recommendations to Congress on this issue in a May 2002 letter. (See the appendix for the letter to Congress and the accompanying recommendations.)

  • The Commission recommends that Congress establish a corporate code of conduct for U.S. businesses operating in China. Aside from addressing traditional human rights and labor issues, the code should also mandate corporate responsibility in categories of special concern, such as the suppression of personal freedoms. Companies that fail to comply with the code of conduct should be afforded less favorable terms on Ex-Im Bank or OPIC-supported transactions or on other U.S. Government financial assistance.

  • The Commission recommends that Congress request Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and other relevant government entities to seek ways to help Chinese Internet users access banned information sources.

  • The Commission recommends that Congress request that the President direct the Department of Commerce and other relevant agencies to conduct a review of export administration regulations to determine whether to control the export of U.S. technologies that permit the Chinese government to surveil its own people or censor free speech.

ENDNOTES:

1. A more detailed discussion of American goals for Chinese economic integration appears in Chapter 3.
2. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Hearing on Human Rights in China in the Context of the Rule of Law, Written Testimony of Stanley Lubman, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 February 2002, Commission print, 86.
3. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Hearing on Human Rights in China in the Context of the Rule of Law, Written Testimony of James Feinerman, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 7 February 2002, Commission print 59; Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 3.
4. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Trade/ Sectoral and WTO Issues, Written Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, 14 June 2001, 2.
5. U.S-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on WTO Compliance and Sectoral Issues, Written Testimony of Donald C. Clarke, 18 January 2002, 6. A 1998 study of nine basic-level courts (the lowest level) in a major provincial city revealed that only three percent of the judges had a bachelor’s degree in law and that the "great majority" had had other types of jobs in the court administration such as bailiff, clerk, or driver before being promoted to the rank of judge.
6. Cohen, Written Testimony, 5.
7. Rowan Callick, Global Corruption Report 2001: East Asia and the Pacific, Robin Hodess ed. (Berlin: Transparency International, 2001), 11.
8. Ibid.
9. HU, Angang, "Fubai Zaocheng le Duoshao Jingji Sunshi?" ("How Much Economic Loss Has Corruption Created?"), Renmin Ribao BBS Luntan Zhi Qiangguo Luntan (People’s Daily and BBS discussion on Strengthening the Country), 2 March 2002.
10. Cohen, Written Testimony, 5.
11. He, Qinglian, "A Comprehensive Analysis of the Current Structural Metamorphosis of Chinese Society," trans. U.S-China Security Review Commission, 31 May 2002.
12. "Something Rotten in the State of China, " The Economist (U.S. Edition), 16 February 2002, sec. Asia.
13. Ibid.
14. He Zengke, "Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Reform China", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, (June 2000); Zong Hairen, Zhu Rongji in 1999 (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 2001), 142-143.
15. Henry S. Rowen, "The Growth of Freedoms in China," Asia / Pacific Research Center, Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (April 2001): 11; House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Hearing on U.S. Policy Options toward China: Rule of Law and Democracy Programs, Oral Testimony of Allen Choate, 105th cong., 2nd sess., 30 April 1998.
16. Rowen, "The Growth of Freedoms in China," 13.
17. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001: China, including Hong Kong and Macau," U.S. Department of State, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm> (30 March 2002).
18. Feinerman, Written Testimony, 59.
19. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, "China Trade/Sectoral and WTO Issues," Written Testimony of Richard Trumka, 14 June 2001, 6.
20. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on U.S. Implementation of Prison Labor Agreements with China, Written Testimony of Jeffrey Bader, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 21 May 1997, Committee Print, 18.
The Laogai Research Foundation, "A Rare Insight into China’s Laogai Economy: Dun & Bradstreet Directory Lists Forced Labor Camps" (Washington, D.C.: The Laogai Research Institute 1999), 1.
22 "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001: China, including Hong Kong and Macau," U.S. Department of State, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm> (30 March 2002).
23 U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on Bilateral Trade Policies and Issues between the United States and China, Oral Testimony of Donald Shruhan, 2 August 2001, 84.
24. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on Bilateral Trade Policies and Issues between the United States and China, Oral Testimony of Charles Winwood, 2 August 2001, 64.
25. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Technical Briefing on Business, Trade and Economic Issues, Written Testimony of Harry Wu, 9 May 2001, 4.
26. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on U.S. Implementation of Prison Labor Agreements with China, Written Testimony of Jeffrey Bader, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 21 May 1997, Committee Print, 18.
27. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001: China, including Hong Kong and Macau," U.S. Department of State, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm> (30 March 2002).
28. Ibid.
29. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001: China, including Hong Kong and Macau," U.S. Department of State, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm> (30 March 2002).
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Roundtable on Labor Rights in China, Written Testimony of Mark Hankin, 18 March 2002, 10; Lori Montgomery, "China’s Reforms Stop at Courtroom Door," The Washington Post, 28 June 2002, sec. A, 1.
33. The Business Roundtable, "Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Practices by U.S. Companies," (Washington, D.C.: The Business Roundtable, 2000): 3-6.
34. "Made in China: The Role of U.S. Companies in Denying Human and Worker Rights," (New York: National Labor Committee, 2000); U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on China Trade/ Sectoral and WTO Issues, Written Testimony of Richard Trumka, 14 June 2001, 5.
35. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on Bilateral Trade Policies and Issues between the United States and China, Written Testimony of Steve Beckman, 2 August 2001, 8.
36. U.S.-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on Bilateral Trade Policies and Issues between the United States and China, Written Testimony of Leo W. Gerard, 2 August 2001, 1.
37. Nina Hachigian, "China’s Cyber-Strategy," Foreign Affairs 80 (March/April 2001): 118.
38. "Ninth Comprehensive Survey ," China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), January 2002.
39. Pamela Yatsko, "China’s Web Censors Win One—For Now; David vs. Goliath in Cyberspace," Fortune International, 24 December 2001, sec. Fortune Asia, 19.
40. Ethan Gutmann, "Who Lost China’s Internet," The Weekly Standard, 25 February 2002, 24; Martin Fackler, "China Looks abroad for Latest Technology to Police Internet," Associated Press, 8 November 2000, sec. Financial pages; Greg Walton, China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2001; Ted Bridis, "China Exacts Computer-Virus Samples," Wall Street Journal, 30 March 2001, sec. B, 3; Pamela Yatsko, "China’s Web Censors Win One—For Now, 19.
41. "PRC Public Security Ministry Calls For Strict Control Over Internet," Hong Kong Ming Pao (Internet version), 13 April 2002, B14; translated in FBIS.
42. Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, "Internet Crackdown Intensifies," South China Morning Post, 17 April 2002.
43. Gutmann, "Who Lost China’s Internet," 24.
44. Steven Mufson and John Pomfret, "You've Got Dissidents? AOL Weighs China Market -- and Rights Issues," The Washington Post, 29 August 2001, sec. A, 1.
45. Michael Chase and James Mulvenon, "You’ve Got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet and Beijing’s Counter-Strategies," Rand Corporation (March 2002): xiii.
46. Gutmann, "Who Lost China’s Internet," 24.
47. Chase and Mulvenon, "You’ve Got Dissent!," xiii.
48. Eric Lichtblau, "CIA Warns of Chinese Plans for Cyber-Attacks on U.S.," Los Angeles Times, 25 April 2002, sec. A1, 1.
49. U.S-China Security Review Commission, Hearing on WTO Compliance and Sectoral Issues, Written Testimony of Roger Uren, 18 January 2002.
50. Rowen, "The Growth of Freedoms in China," 20. China today has over 1,000 television stations and 2,000 newspapers. As of 1998, over 130,000 book titles were published, with 7.24 billion copies in print.
51. Perry Link, "The Anaconda and the Chandelier: Censorship in China Today," U.S.-China Security Review Commission website, < http://www.uscc.gov/link.htm > (30 May 2002).
52. Wu Xuecan, "Turning Everyone into a Censor: The Chinese Communist Party's All-Directional Control over the Media," U.S.-China Security Review Commission Website, <http://www.uscc.gov/censorship_ym.pdf > (30 May 2002).
53. Perry Link, "The Anaconda and the Chandelier".
54. Uren, Written Testimony.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Calum Macleod, "Analysis: How to break into China Waves," United Press International, 5 September 2001, sec. General News.
58. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001: China, including Hong Kong and Macau," U.S. Department of State, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm> (30 March 2002).
59. Ibid.
60. Xiqiu Fu and Shixiong Li, eds., Religion and National Security in China: Secret Documents from China’s Security Sector (New York: Committee for Investigation on Persecution of Religion in China, 11 February 2002).
61. Amy Epstein Gadsden and Anne F. Thurston, "Village Elections in China: Progress, Problems and Prospects," International Republican Institute, January 2001, <http://www.iri.org/pdfs/chinaFinalReport.pdf> (May 30, 2002).
62. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001: China, including Hong Kong and Macau," U.S. Department of State, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm> (30 March 2002).
63. Ibid.
64. Ellen Bork, "Hong Kong in a Chokehold: One Country, One System," The Weekly Standard, 12 February 2001, sec. Features, p.25; Mark Moore, "Reflecting back on Three Years of the Hong Kong Update," CSIS Hong Kong Update (Fall 2000): 5.